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ABSTRACT
This project identifies a cognitive bias that has not been studied as an independent
construct in previous research. This bias is related to the thought-action fusion bias that
has been examined in work on obsessive-compulsive disorder and various mood
disorders. The newly identified bias, labeled positive thought-action fusion, focuses on a
belief that one’s personal thoughts regarding positive outcomes can have an influence on
real-life events. For example, a person may think that he will win the lottery, and he
believes that this thought has actually improved his chance of winning. This project
involves two studies, which together show that (1) the positive thought-action fusion bias
does exist as an independent construct, (2) we now have a valid measure with which to
measure it, and (3) that this bias is related to some forms of risk-taking behaviour and
impaired mental control. Implications and future directions for research are discussed.
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Seeking the Other Side of Thought – Action Fusion:
Implications for Risk - Taking in Young Adulthood
Traditional university-aged students (aged 18-25) fall within a time-frame of the
life-span called emerging adulthood, and risk-taking behaviour is common during this
developmental period (Todesco, 2005). Academic risk-taking behaviours, such as
skipping classes or not studying, can result in a change in life trajectories for young
adults in some circumstances. Gambling behaviours result in problem gambling at double
the rate in youth aged 18-24 than in the adult population (Problem Gambling Institute of
Ontario, 2013), and can lead to distraction from studies as well as the possible loss of
tuition money. Sexual risk-taking behaviours can lead to unwanted pregnancies, or
sexually transmitted infections (Norton, Fisher, Amico, Dovidio, & Johnson, 2012).
Alcohol and drug-use can lead to unusual behaviours by the users, such as passing out or
becoming aggressive, which can contribute to the drug or alcohol user becoming the
perpetrator or a vulnerable victim of various crimes (Gustavson et al., 2007; Nayak,
Lown, Bond, & Greenfield, 2012). Due to the detrimental nature of many of these risky
behaviours, this research project seeks to increase the knowledge base of factors
associated with risk propensity by examining a possible risk factor that has not been
previously considered in the literature. Specifically, this project investigates a cognitive
bias that may contribute to increased risk propensity.
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Chapter 1
Thought – Action Fusion
Thought-action fusion (Rachman, 1993) is a phenomenon in which a person
believes that his or her thoughts have direct influence on events. This construct has not
been previously examined for its possible association to risk propensity; therefore, this
investigation of a particular dimension of thought-action fusion will increase the breadth
of knowledge regarding risk-taking in young adulthood.
The concept of thought-action fusion (TAF) originated in research with people who
experienced obsessive thoughts and displayed compulsive behaviours (Rachman, 1993).
These people showed signs of having an exaggerated sense of responsibility, wherein
they ascribed internal causal attributions to events from unrelated external forces.
Rachman described how this personal responsibility was not only directed at their
actions, or omissions of action, but also at their thoughts. These people were found to
assign unjustified importance to random, unwanted thoughts. Furthermore, they assumed
personal responsibility for these thoughts. For example, a person may have a random
thought that there is a possibility that his or her friend might have a car accident, then
assume responsibility for the thought (I must want my friend to have a car accident), and
assign unjustified importance to that thought (Since I thought about my friend being in a
car accident, she will probably have a car accident). Rachman (1997, 1998) developed the
cognitive theory of obsession to explain this phenomenon. This theory describes how the
perceived importance of normal thoughts can become inflated if one suffers from certain
cognitive biases.
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The original thought-action fusion (TAF) phenomenon was divided into two
subcategories—moral and likelihood—with the second being further divided into
likelihood-self and likelihood-other (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996a). Moral
TAF is the belief that having an unacceptable thought is just as bad as actually
performing the act associated with the thought. For example, one item from the TAF
moral subscale is “when I have a nasty thought about someone else, it is almost as bad as
carrying out a nasty action” (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996b). The TAF
likelihood-self dimension assesses items that reflect a belief that having intrusive
thoughts about oneself will increase the possibility of negative events occurring to the
self. For example, an item from the TAF likelihood-self subscale is, “If I think of myself
being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that I will have a fall and be injured”
(Shafran et al., 1996b). Similarly, the likelihood-other dimension assesses items that
reflect a belief that having intrusive thoughts about someone else will increase the
possibility of negative events occurring to that person. An example of a TAF likelihoodother subscale item is, “If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk that
he/she will fall ill” (Shafran, et al., 1996b).
It has been suggested that thought-action fusion may be a specific form of magical
ideation (Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary & Brigidi, 2001). The term magical ideation
refers to causal beliefs that are considered invalid by conventional standards (Eckblad
& Chapman, 1983a). Specifically, it involves the idea that ambiguous behaviours or other
events are the actual causal factors of unrelated occurrences. Thought-action fusion is a
fairly specific concept, whereas, magical thinking is a broad construct that encompasses a
wide variety of causal misconceptions, paranormal phenomena, superstitions, and
3

religious beliefs. For example, Tobacyk and Wilkinson (1990) found statistically
significant relationships between magical thinking and beliefs in spiritualism,
superstition, and witchcraft. In a later study, the same authors (Tobacyk and Wilkinson,
1991) reported a significant relationship between playing games of chance (gambling
behaviours) and paranormal beliefs, religious beliefs and superstitions. Magical thinking
has been investigated in populations with clinical disorders, such as its function as a
symptom of schizotypy, or schizophrenia proneness (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983a),
and with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Einstein & Menzies, 2004). It has also been
investigated for its developmental role with children (Phelps and Woolley, 1994).
Since thought-action fusion is thought to be a component of magical thinking
(Amir et al., 2001), it is possible that TAF could be related to several other phenomena,
such as superstition, positivity, religion, belief in good luck, and hope. In fact, some
authors have described similarities between thought-action fusion and superstition
(García-Montes, Pérez-Álvarez, Sass & Cangas, 2008). However, the thought-action
fusion construct can be distinguished from superstition because of the thought-action
causal attributions in TAF (“If I think it, the likelihood of it happening will be increased”)
versus the action-action causal attributions in superstitions (“If I break a mirror,
something bad will happen”). These concepts can also be differentiated on the basis of
the personal responsibility ascribed by the person to his or her own intrusive thoughts (“I
must want her to be in an accident”), rather than a superstitious person’s belief that there
is possible misfortune that should be avoided, such as “I must avoid walking under
ladders.” The personal-responsibility component ascribed to creating “causal” thoughts
can also be used to differentiate between thought-action fusion and belief in outcomes
4

from religious prayer to a deity. However, research by Rassin and Koster (2003) found a
statistically significant correlation between participants who identified with certain
religions and the moral TAF subscale, and a moderate correlation between religiosity and
the total TAF score. Marino, Lunt, and Negy (2008) performed structural equation
modeling to investigate the possible relationship between religion and TAF. They
concluded that the degree of religious conviction might have an influence on the
relationship between religion and TAF because this association is mediated by a
subjective belief of inflated responsibility, which is believed to possibly be influenced by
unusually rigid religion-based beliefs.
Berle and Starcevic (2005) performed a review of the TAF literature including past
empirical studies. They described how thought-action fusion could be an appraisal or a
belief. For an example of TAF as an appraisal, if a person had an intrusive thought, such
as “My father is getting older now, and may die soon,” the person might interpret it as
“my thought has now increased the chance that my father will die soon.” However,
thought-action fusion may also be considered a trait-like belief style, in that the person
develops a generalized belief that thinking about things increases the probability of their
occurrence. The authors examined the information from multiple studies, and surmised
that it is possible that TAF exists as both appraisals and enduring beliefs. Berle and
Starcevic also encouraged assessment of TAF across a continuum, because the ranges
and variability of scores from the various studies they reviewed suggested that TAF is
best conceptualized as a continuous variable.
Past research with thought-action fusion has generally maintained a focus on
people’s beliefs that negative events may result as a consequence of their personal
5

thoughts (e.g., Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Rachman, 1993; Shafran & Rachman, 2004).
However, it is possible that there are two different sides to thought-action fusion—
positive and negative—and whilst Rachman and others (e.g., Muris, Meesters, Rassin,
Merckelbach, & Campbell, 2001; O'Leary, Rucklidge, & Blampied, 2009) have
thoroughly investigated the negative part of this construct, there is a lack of literature
regarding beliefs that positive events will result as a consequence of personal thoughts.
One possible reason for the gap in literature is because the thought-action fusion
construct was developed from clinical investigations of people with obsessivecompulsive disorder (OCD). Since that time, investigations involving this construct have
remained within the boundaries of populations expressing symptoms associated with
clinical disorders. For example, in a literature review, Berle and Starcevic found that TAF
was prevalent in depression, eating disorders, psychotic disorders, generalized anxiety
disorder, and other anxiety disorders in addition to its association with obsessivecompulsive symptoms.
O'Leary, Rucklidge, and Blampied (2009) provided a specific example of TAF
research with their study of TAF and the inflated responsibility that is associated with it.
They used a sample of 63 participants including adults diagnosed with OCD (n = 20),
adults diagnosed with other anxiety disorders (n = 21), and non-clinical controls (n = 22).
The researchers found higher levels of inflated responsibility and TAF in the clinical
groups than in the control group. They also found that inflated responsibility was higher
in participants with OCD compared to those with other anxiety disorders. On the other
hand, TAF was not found to be exclusive to those with OCD, as there were no significant
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differences in TAF between the group diagnosed with OCD and the group diagnosed
with other anxiety disorders.
Muris and his colleagues (2001) looked at TAF in adolescence. The authors
developed the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire for Adolescents (TAFQ-A) and
administered it to a non-clinical sample of 427 adolescents, aged 13 – 16 years. The
TAFQ-A was developed with questions that were designed to be meaningful for
adolescents. Similar to the TAF Scale developed by Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman
(1996b), the TAFQ-A focuses on negative consequences. Each question on the TAFQ-A
is preceded by a brief vignette to help the adolescents imagine themselves in specific
situations. For example, one question on the TAFQ-A reads “Suddenly without any
reason you have the thought that you are dying. Having this thought increases the risk
that you really are going to die.” The TAFQ-A contains 15 items that are scored on a
four-point scale that ranges from 1 = Not at all true to 4 = Very true. The authors were
able to provide evidence for the reliability of the TAFQ-A. They also found that thoughtaction fusion was related to symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder and a broad
range of anxiety disorders.
The two examples of TAF research provided above (Muris et al., 2001; O'Leary,
Rucklidge, & Blampied, 2009) provide examples of how past thought-action fusion
studies have focused on negative cognitive distortions in participants who report
symptoms associated with clinical disorders. The possible existence of thought-action
fusion with positive outcomes has been looked at before this time; however, it has never
been investigated as a distinct phenomenon. Previous research has only ever looked at
whether or not question items with positive consequences are related to OCD in a similar
7

fashion as negative items. For example, Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman (1996a) tested
eight positive items during construction of the Thought-Action Fusion Scale - Revised.
The items that were investigated focused on dimensions of positive thought-action fusion
that suggested gains from positive thought, such as “If I think of winning the lottery, that
will increase the chance that I win the lottery.” The researchers removed the items
because they felt that they were not relevant to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Amir
and his colleagues (2001) also investigated a positive aspect of TAF. These researchers
looked at the dimension of positive thoughts that focused on harm prevention from
positive thoughts, such as “If I think of a relative/friend being able to avoid a car
accident, this increases the chance that he/she will be able to avoid a car accident.”
However, this construct was only investigated for its relationship to obsessivecompulsive tendencies, by comparing the scores on the positive TAF items between
participants with OCD tendencies and participants without OCD tendencies. While past
research has kept the thought-action fusion construct within the boundaries of OCD,
anxiety, and the clinical environment, the current project attempted to examine positive
TAF as a distinct construct that is relevant to social phenomena, specifically, risk-taking
behaviour.
Study1
Since this project seeks to investigate a construct that has not been previously
explored, a new scale for measurement was required. A pilot study was conducted with
198 undergraduate student participants for the development and psychometric analyses of
a positive thought-action fusion scale. The current Thought-Action Fusion construct
(Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996a) contains the three dimensions, labeled (1)
8

Moral, (2) Likelihood-Other, and (3) Likelihood-Self; whereas, the Positive ThoughtAction Fusion scale constructed for the pilot study included five dimensions, due to the
existence of both positive gains and harm-avoidance, as suggested in previous literature
(Amir et al., 2001; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman,1996a). Items for the new Positive
TAF Scale (P-TAF) were developed to closely resemble the items from the TAF-R scale
created by Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman. For example, an item from the TAF-R
scale is “If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this increases the risk that
he/she will have a car accident,” and an item from the Positive TAF Scale is “If I think of
a friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will have a
car accident.”
Study 1 was used to establish that there actually is a positive dimension to the
thought-action fusion phenomenon, and that it could be measured. It was used to
investigate the thought-action fusion construct in a non-clinical environment with a
sample of young adults. Specifically, magical ideation was studied due to its relationship
to thought-action fusion, and its hypothesized relationship to positive thought-action
fusion. In addition, the relationships between positive TAF and positivity, attention to
positive information, hope, religion, and belief in good luck were investigated. These
variables were chosen as they represent conceptually similar phenomena. Positivity,
attention to positive information, and hope all relate to positive thinking, while religion
and belief in good luck both represent cognitive biases, in that they are based in faith. The
hypotheses for Study 1 were:
H1: There is a positive dimension to the thought-action fusion phenomenon
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H2: The positive thought-action fusion phenomenon is related to magical ideation
H3: The positive thought-action fusion scale can demonstrate convergent and
discriminant validity with low to moderate correlational relationships to
conceptually similar phenomena (hope, positivity, religiosity, belief in good luck,
and attention to positive information)
H4: The construct validity of the positive thought-action fusion scale will be
supported through its relationship to Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman’s
(1996b) Thought-Action Fusion Scale - Revised
H5: The Positive TAF scale has 5 subscales, including Moral, Others-Gain, SelfGain, Others-Harm-avoidance, and Self-Harm-Avoidance
Method
Participants
A sample of 198 students was obtained through the University of Windsor’s
Psychology participant pool. There was a diverse representation of the student population
for both age (range = 16 to 44; M = 21.51) and ethnicity (White / European = 56.1%,
Black / African / Caribbean = 7.6%, Latin / South American = 3%, East Asian / Chinese /
Japanese = 8.6%, South Asian / Indian / Pakistan = 12.6%, Middle Eastern = 11.6%,
Multiracial = 1.5%, Other = 1.5%). There was an overrepresentation of female students in
the sample (Female = 161, Male = 36, No Response = 1), which is common with samples
drawn from the participant pool.
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Measures
Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (TAF). This instrument was developed
by Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman (1996b). The Thought-Action Fusion Scale
Revised (TAF-R) contains 19 items that are measured on a five-point scale that ranges
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The TAF-R has three subscales, including
the TAF-Moral subscale, which has items such as “Thinking of making an extremely
critical remark to a friend is almost as unacceptable to me as actually saying it.” The
second subscale is TAF-Likelihood-Others, and these items focus on a belief that
unwanted thoughts can result in negative consequences for others, such as “If I think of a
relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk that they will lose their job.” The
third subscale is TAF-Likelihood-Self, and these items focus on a belief that unwanted
thoughts can result in negative consequences for the person thinking those thoughts. For
example, one item is, “If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall
ill.”
Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman (1996a) provided evidence for the adequate
psychometric properties of the TAF-R Scale at the time the measure was developed.
Since that time, the scale has gained supporting evidence from several sources (e.g.,
Pourfaraj, Mohammadi, & Taghavi, 2008; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt,
2001; Yorulmaz, Yilmaz, & Gençöz, 2004), some of which have involved research in a
variety of nations.
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P – TAF). This instrument was
developed for the current project. It contains 26 items that are measured on a seven-point
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scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” rather than the five-point
scale that was used in the TAF-R scale (please see Appendix A). The P - TAF scale was
made with this scale differentiation in order to increase the variability of the scale, which
attempts to address the idea that positive thought-action fusion should be best
conceptualized on a continuum. A main difference between the Positive TAF Scale and
the TAF – R scale is that the Positive TAF is intended to measure people’s beliefs about
their thoughts having a direct influence on positive outcomes, rather than on the negative
outcomes that are assessed by the TAF - R scale. Another difference between the TAF –
R scale and the positive TAF scale is that the Positive TAF Scale conceptually has five
subscales instead of three. The TAF-Likelihood-Others and TAF-Likelihood-Self
subscales were further divided for the Positive TAF scale into positive-gain and harmavoidance categories, resulting in Moral, Others-Gain, Self-Gain, Others-Harmavoidance, and Self-Harm-Avoidance; however, an item-level analysis was required to
verify this conceptualized subscale structure.
Magical Ideation Scale (MIS). This instrument was developed by Eckblad
and Chapman (1983b). It is a 30-item, true/false measure that has been used to study
magical beliefs for approximately 30 years. This scale measures people’s beliefs in
superstitions, paranormal activity, extraterrestrials, and other unconventional beliefs. The
authors reported good coefficient alpha values (Males, α = .82; Females, α = .85). They
also provided evidence of validity through correlational analyses of the relationships
between the MIS and conceptually relevant scales.
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI). This instrument was recently developed by
Kingdon, Egan, and Rees (2012). The IBI is a 24-item measure that has been developed
12

to assess magical beliefs on a five-point scale. The IBI has a three-factor structure
including (1) magical beliefs, (2) spirituality, and (3) internal state and thought-action
fusion. This measure was created mainly because The Magical Ideation Scale (MIS:
Eckblad & Chapman, 1983b) was designed to measure magical thinking in a clinical
sample, not the general population; hence, the MIS contains items that measure delusions
and other symptoms of psychosis. Although the IBI removed the items that were
indicative of psychosis, it created items specifically intended to assess TAF and
superstition, because Kingdon and her colleagues considered these items to be more
applicable in research using non-clinical samples. The IBI demonstrated acceptable
internal reliability for the subscales (Magical Beliefs, α = .84; Spirituality, α = .87;
Internal State, α = .75), and excellent internal consistency reliability for the overall scale
(α = .93), as reported by Kingdon and her colleagues. This study used both the MIS and
the IBI due to the recent development of the IBI, and the variation of factors assessed in
both scales.
Hope Scale. This instrument was developed by Snyder et al. (1991). This is a
twelve-item measure that measures hope using both agency and pathway subscales.
‘Hope agency’ refers to an individual’s belief that he or she capable of achieving positive
outcomes, and ‘hope pathways’ refers to the planning in order to achieve goals. These
items are rated on a four-point scale that ranges from “definitely false” to “definitely
true,” and includes items such as “There are lots of ways around any problem.” The
authors documented evidence of convergent and discriminant validity, as well as
demonstrating acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability.
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Positivity Scale. This instrument (Caprara et al., 2012b) is an 8-item measure
assessing participants’ tendency to view life and experiences with a positive outlook on a
five-point scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Caprara and his
colleagues (2012a) provided evidence of internal reliability, construct validity, and testretest reliability. They also provided evidence for the validity of the scale`s use in crosscultural studies, which suggests that the measure is applicable for diverse populations.
Spirituality/Religiosity Scale. This instrument was developed by Good,
Willoughby, and Busseri (2011). It is an eight-item measure that assesses religiosity and
spirituality. Four questions use a five-point rating scale ranging from 1(never) to 5 (every
day). One question uses a four-point scale from 1 (I never enjoy these activities) to 4 (I
usually enjoy these activities). The remaining three items use a five-point scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This measure contains items such as “In the past
month, how often have you prayed?”
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL). This instrument was developed by Darke
and Freedman (1997). It is a 15-item scale that measures the participants’ beliefs about
good luck on a six-point scale, with items such as “Some people are consistently lucky,
and others are unlucky.” Darke and Freedman reported a good internal consistency (α =
.85), and provided evidence to support the test-retest reliability, as well as the
discriminant validity and convergent validity of the scale.
Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale (APNI). This instrument
(Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 2006b) assesses individual differences concerning the
cognitive tendencies to focus on either positive or negative information. This measure
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uses a five-point scale that ranges from “very untrue of me” to “very true of me,” and
contains items such as “I easily see the fun side of any activity that I’m in.” Noguchi,
Gohm, and Dalsky (2006a) provided evidence for construct validity, as well as
convergent and discriminant validity during the construction of this measure.
Background Information. This is a demographic measure used to collect
information about the participants’ gender, age, ethnicity, and year of study. It was
included mainly for the purpose of describing the sample.
Procedure
The pilot study was conducted online using FluidSurveys, and took approximately
30 minutes to complete. Students were awarded 0.5 bonus point through the participant
pool, to be used toward an eligible psychology course. The items on many of the scales
are similar, such as those on the Magical Ideation Scale and those on the Illusory Beliefs
Inventory. Therefore, the order of the scales was chosen to vary the subject matter of the
items, as an attempt to reduce fatigue effects. The Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale
was ordered first to ensure that the participants’ responses to the new scale would not be
biased by reading any other measures before completing the new scale. The Positive
Thought-Action Fusion Scale was followed, in order, by the Hope Scale (Snyder et al.,
1991), the Magical Ideation Scale (MIS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1983b), the Positivity
Scale (Caprara et al., 2012), the Spirituality/Religiosity Scale (Good, Willoughby, &
Busseri, 2011), the Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI; Kingdon, Egan, & Rees, 2012), the
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL; Darke & Freedman, 1997), the Thought-Action
Fusion Scale-Revised (TAF Scale; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996b), the
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Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale (APNI; Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky,
2006), and the background information measure.
Results
Data analyses for Study 1 were focused on the psychometric evaluation of the
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale. As evidence for construct validity, both
convergent and discriminant validity were investigated using correlational analyses.
Positive TAF is a new construct, so there are no measures that are conceptually equal.
However, if someone has the positive TAF cognitive bias, it could be expected that they
would also endorse good luck, hope, and other similar constructs. This relationship is
probably one-sided; wherein, those who endorse positive TAF also endorse constructs
such as hope and luck, but those who endorse hope and luck would not necessarily
endorse positive TAF.
A total of 227 participants were recruited through the Psychology participant pool
to take part in the survey. There were 29 incomplete entries, resulting in 198 cases for use
in the study. The entire survey, including all measures, contained 156 items. There were
46 cases that were missing data for one item, two cases that were missing data for three
items, one case that was missing data for four items, and one case that was missing data
for six items. Analyses of the missing data patterns suggested that all these data were
missing at random; therefore, a multiple imputation method was used to fill in the
missing data prior to analyses.
Normality was examined with the use of histograms, as well as skew and kurtosis
values. All histograms approached normal distributions, and the skew and kurtosis values
16

fell within the acceptable ranges (skew between -2 and 2, kurtosis between -3 and 3).
Linearity and outliers were assessed by visual inspection of bivariate scatterplots. All of
the scatterplots displayed linear relationships. There was no indication of any outliers that
were influencing the relationships between any of the variables. Please see Appendix B
for descriptive information of all scales for Study 1.
The internal reliability of all scales and subscales were tested using Cronbach’s
alpha. Most of the internal consistencies fell in the acceptable (.6 ≤ α < .7), good (.7 ≤ α <
.9), or excellent (α ≥ .9) ranges. There were two scales that were in the poor (.5 ≤ α < .6)
range: The Hope Scale (α = .55) and the Positivity Scale (α = .59). Please see Table 1 for
all reliability values.
In assessing discriminant validity, a correlational analysis between the P - TAF
Scale and the Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) resulted in a weak correlation that was not
significant, r(198) = .12, p = .094. Similarly, there was not a significant correlation
between the Positivity Scale (Caprara et al., 2012) and the P - TAF Scale, r(198) = .03,
p = .725. Attention to positive information (as measured by the positive subscale of the
Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale; Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 2006)
was also not significantly related to the P - TAF Scale, r(198) = .12, p = .104. These
results provide evidence for discriminant validity, as the P-TAF Scale is intended to
measure a cognitive bias, rather than positive thinking.
The Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale was moderately positively correlated
with the Belief in Good Luck Scale, r(198) = .42, p < .001, the Magical Ideation Scale,
r(198) = .51, p < .001, the Illusory Beliefs Inventory, r(198) = .53, p < .001, the TAF-R,
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r(198) = .57, p < .000, and the Spirituality / Religiosity Scale, r(198) = .36, p < .001.
These relationships provide support for convergent validity for the P - TAF Scale, as
these scales all assess various cognitive biases. Please see Appendix C for a listing of all
correlations, including correlations between the measurement subscales.
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Table 1 Scale and Subscale Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for all measures
Number
of Scale
Items

Scale
Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (TAF-R)

Alpha

19

.94

12

.94

TAF-R Likelihood Others

4

.95

TAF-R Likelihood Self

3

.81

26

.95

P-TAF Moral

3

.71

P-TAF Likelihood Others Gain

5

.91

P-TAF Others Harm-Avoidance

5

.86

P-TAF Likelihood Self Gain

8

.87

P-TAF Self Harm-Avoidance

5

.78

Magical Ideation Scale (MIS)

30

.88

Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI)

24

.88

10

.79

IBI Spirituality

9

.80

IBI Internal State/Thought-Action Fusion

5

.79

12

.55

Hope Agency

4

.80

Hope Pathways

4

.67

Positivity Scale

8

.59

Spirituality / Religiosity Scale

8

.86

Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL)

15

.85

Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale (APNI)

22

.85

APNI positive

11

.92

APNI negative

11

.88

TAF-R Moral

Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P-TAF)

IBI Magical Beliefs

Hope Scale
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Study 1 Discussion
The Positive TAF Scale contains 26 items on a seven-point scale. Therefore, the
participants’ total scores had possible values ranging from a minimum of 26 to a
maximum of 182. The participants in this study reported values that ranged from 26 to
161, with 14.4% of the participants scoring over 100. This supports Hypothesis 1, which
stated, “There is a positive dimension to the thought-action fusion phenomenon.”
Hypothesis 2 purported that the positive thought-action fusion phenomenon is
related to magical ideation. This hypothesis was supported with moderate correlations
between positive TAF and magical beliefs, as measured by the Magical Ideation Scale
and the Illusory Beliefs Scale.
Hypothesis 3 stated that the positive thought-action fusion scale can demonstrate
convergent and discriminant validity with low to moderate correlational relationships to
conceptually similar phenomena. Positive TAF was not significantly related to hope,
positivity or attention to positive information. This supports the discriminant validity of
the Positive TAF construct, as this measure was designed to assess a cognitive bias
instead of assessing positive thinking. The absence of high correlations provides evidence
that positive TAF is not the same as optimism or positive thinking, but rather it is a
distinct construct.
Support for convergent validity was gained through the moderate correlations
between positive TAF and spirituality, and between positive TAF and belief in good luck.
Both spirituality (faith) and belief in good luck are forms of cognitive biases. These
moderate correlations show that the Positive TAF Scale is measuring a construct that is
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conceptually similar to these other constructs, which is consistent with theory. At the
same time, the absence of extremely high correlations shows that positive TAF is distinct
from these other constructs. Please see Appendix C for the relationships between positive
TAF and conceptually similar constructs.
The construct validity of the positive thought-action fusion scale was supported
through its relationship to Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman’s (1996b) Thought-Action
Fusion Scale, which provides support for Hypothesis 4.
The subscale structure of the Positive TAF scale (Moral, Others-Gain, Self-Gain,
Others-Harm-avoidance, and Self-Harm-Avoidance) was examined using the internal
reliability of each subscale. The Cronbach’s alpha values provided support for
Hypothesis 5 with evidence for the five-subscale structure, including P-TAF Moral, PTAF Likelihood-Others Gain, P-TAF Others Harm-Avoidance, P-TAF Likelihood-Self
Gain, and P-TAF Self Harm-Avoidance.
Overall, Study 1 was successful in providing support for the validity and internal
reliability of the Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale. The results indicated that the PTAF Scale is suitable for use in Study 2, which looks at the relationship of the positive
TAF cognitive bias to various forms of risky behaviour and risk perception. One of the
limitations for Study 1 is the inability to perform an exploratory factor analysis due to an
insufficient sample size. Another limitation is that the positive TAF construct was not
tested for its association to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Both of these limitations
were addressed in Study 2.
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Chapter 2
Risk Taking in Young Adulthood
The focus of Study 2 is on the relationship of positive thought-action fusion to
risky behaviour. There are several forms of risk that are prevalent among young adults.
These forms of risk include academic risk-taking, gambling behaviours, risky sexual
behaviours, and alcohol and drug use. Academic risk-taking can involve a wide variety of
behaviours, including skipping class and failing to do assignments. Other academic
behaviours, such as procrastination, have also been found to be a form of risk-taking
(Keinan & Bereby-Meyer, 2012; Schouwenburg, 1992). Procrastination and other risky
academic behaviours can affect students’ grades and academic standing. Gambling
behaviours are pure risk by definition, and thus, provide an exemplar for studying risk
propensity. Additionally, gambling behaviours have been implicated as an impediment to
academic success (Dickson & Derevensky, 2006).
Most people engage in risky behaviours on a daily basis. For example, in 2010,
170,629 Canadians were injured in vehicle collisions (Transportation Canada, 2014), yet
most people still choose to drive their car every day. Furthermore, there are also many
risks that are beneficial to the person taking the risk and to society as a whole. If no one
engaged in risk-taking behaviour, progress would be non-existent—new drugs could not
be developed without human drug trials, and new inventions would not be realized if no
one took a risk to invest in their development. Risk is also discussed in the context of
situations that people find themselves in, such as the risk associated with growing up in
poverty. Extensive research has focused on risky contexts and people who display
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resilience to these risks (Fraser, Galinsky & Richman, 1999). However, the current study
only focuses on four distinct forms of risk-taking behaviour: Gambling, Drug / alcohol
use, risky sexual behaviour, and academic risk. These forms were chosen for this study as
they represent some of the more common forms of risky behaviour among older
adolescents and young adults. In addition, these forms of risk-taking behaviour represent
some of the variability that is found in various forms of risk taking.
Not all forms of risk are the same. For example, if you want to participate in a
gambling activity, the risk is inherent and unavoidable. The consumption of alcohol and
drugs has a certain amount of inherent risk, but many of these risks can be minimized by
actions such as avoiding binge drinking or avoiding drinking around strangers. Similarly,
engaging in sexual activity carries a certain amount of risk, but these risks can also be
minimized with such things as contraceptive use and avoidance of dangerous situations.
Academic activities do not carry any inherent risks, and are only risky if the student
chooses to engage in risky behaviour. Therefore, a person can still engage in academic
activities even if they are risk averse. Alcohol, drug consumption, and sexual activity can
still be engaged in by a risk-averse individual, provided they take measures to reduce the
risk. However, a person is unable to participate in gambling without unavoidable risk.
The current study employs these four types of risk-taking behaviour in an attempt to
sample some of the diversity found in risk-taking behaviours.
Gambling
Due to its entertainment value, gambling is generally considered a socially
acceptable behaviour. Gambling operations such as bingo halls and casinos employ a
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large number of personnel and generate revenue. Additionally, schools, community
groups, and sports groups hold raffles and various gambling events as fundraising
initiatives. The negative effects of excessive youth gambling, such as personal, social,
legal and educational consequences remain largely unnoticed by the general public.
Although most youth gamble in a controlled manner, many do experience serious
problems (Dickson & Derevensky, 2006).
Gupta and Derevensky (1998) examined gambling behaviour and cognitive
perceptions of gambling activities in a study with 817 secondary school students from the
Montreal Region in Quebec. Over 80% of the students reported gambling in the past year.
Furthermore, they reported gambling more often than they reported participating in other
risky behaviours, such as alcohol and drug use. Pathological gamblers (4.7% of the
students, as measured by the DSM-IV-J; Fisher, 1992) were more likely to be engaging in
illegal activities than non-pathological gamblers. They were also more likely to have
parents with gambling problems.
Barrault and Varescon (2012) researched cognitive distortions in gamblers using
assessments by others and self-report scales. The authors found that people with irrational
beliefs tended to overestimate their control over the outcome of gambling events, and that
having good numeric reasoning did not prevent gamblers from developing false beliefs.
They also found that cognitive distortions were more prevalent in pathological gamblers,
leading them to increase their frequency, and the intensity (financial risk taking) of their
gambling.
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In a review of the literature, Toneatto and Ladoceur (2003) found that there are
very few programs for problem gambling that have been empirically supported; though,
they did find substantial support suggesting that problem gamblers are not a homogenous
group. Toneatto and Ladoceur found that gambling entails a complex interaction between
several components (ecological, psycho-physiological, developmental, cognitive, and
behavioural). The authors evaluated 11 programs and found that programs that employed
cognitive–behavioural methods received the most empirical support. It is possible that
these cognitive-behavioural programs may benefit from the current study, as it seeks to
provide information that will increase the knowledge base about cognitive biases that
may influence risk-taking behaviour.
Drug and Alcohol Use
A study by Killen, Leviton, and Cahill (1991) examined adolescents’ conceptions
of drug use in research with 60 students in Grades 10 to12. Results indicated that the
participants evaluated drug use as either a moral or personal issue. They rarely evaluated
drug use as a social-conventional issue. The students consistently categorized legal and
illegal drugs differently, but they acknowledged that all drugs can cause harm. This
suggests that youth are aware of the risk associated with drug use, but they feel that the
decision of whether or not to use drugs is a personal or moral issue.
Peterson, Baer, Wells, Ginzler, and Garrett (2006) performed a randomized trial
with high-risk youth to evaluate a drug intervention program. Homeless adolescents (N =
285) were assigned to one of three groups, which included two different control groups
and a brief motivational enhancement (ME) group. The ME group was presented with
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personal feedback about patterns of risk related to alcohol or drug use. Follow-up
interviews (1 month and 3 months after the intervention) revealed that the youths in the
ME group did not report any treatment effects for alcohol or marijuana use, but they did
report less illicit drug use for drugs other than marijuana at the one month follow-up.
Unfortunately, this reduction in drug use was not supported at the three-month follow-up,
suggesting that any benefits from this program are temporary. The current study aimed to
increase the knowledge base of cognitive distortions that are associated with risky
behaviours, such as drug use. In doing so, it is possible that the knowledge gained from
this study may be used to strengthen current intervention programs, such as the ME
intervention program described above.
Past research has investigated cognitive distortions in relation to drug use. For
example, Dalton (2006) used archival records from a drug treatment facility for criminal
offenders to investigate the frequency of substance use in relation to cognitive distortions.
The author examined five classes of drugs (ecstasy, alcohol, opiates, hallucinogens, and
amphetamines) and four categories of cognitive distortions (self-centered, blaming
others, minimizing/mislabeling, and assuming the worst). Dalton found a main effect for
patterns of cognitive distortions on ecstasy use, but there were no significant findings for
any of the other substances. By expanding the breadth of cognitive distortions, the current
project may be able to identify a cognitive distortion that relates to other drug use and
other risky behaviours.
Fromme, Katz, and D'Amico (1997) investigated the effects of intoxication on
young adults’ perceptions of negative consequence. Participants (N = 107) were
randomly assigned to either an alcohol consumption group or a control group. Using the
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Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale (CARE: Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997), the
participants provided ratings of the likelihood that positive or negative consequences
would result from a variety of risky activities. The results indicated that participants
perceived significantly fewer negative consequences for drug use, aggressive / illegal
activities, or risky sexual behaviour if they were intoxicated. The findings from this study
suggest that risk perception is rather fluid, and may become distorted on a temporary
basis under certain conditions. It is therefore possible that risk perceptions may become
distorted if someone is suffering from a cognitive distortion that is a temporary appraisal
rather than a trait-like belief, and as mentioned previously, thought-action fusion is
thought to exist as both appraisals and trait-like beliefs (Berle and Starcevic, 2005).
Risky Sexual Behaviour
In a study of risky sexual behaviour (Norton, Fisher, Amico, Dovidio, & Johnson,
2012), college students (N = 198) were randomized into one of four groups, three of
which each received an intervention that focused on a specific negative consequence
from risky sexual activity. The four groups were (1) control group, (2) pregnancy, (3)
STIs, and (4) HIV, and they received an identical intervention program, except that the
emphasis was placed on a different negative consequence for each group. The
experimenters found that participants who were exposed to the pregnancy or STI
intervention programs reported less risky sexual behaviour and greater condom use at
follow-up than those in the HIV group. The authors concluded that participants may have
different behaviour-change outcomes, depending on the focus of the sexual risk
intervention programs they attend. This finding highlights the variability of risk
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perception, and the importance of assessing individual perception when researching risktaking behaviour.
Academic Risk
Bridges and Roig (1997) investigated the relationship between irrational thinking
and academic procrastination. The authors found that procrastination correlated with a
general measure of irrational beliefs, as well as with a subscale of problem avoidance.
Since there is a relationship between thought-action fusion and illusory beliefs (Amir et
al., 2001), and the study by Bridges and Roig found a relationship between irrational
beliefs and procrastination, it follows that there may be a relationship between positive
thought-action fusion and procrastination, which is a form of academic risk.
General Risk
Todesco (2005) examined developmental differences in general risk-taking
behaviours. He also investigated developmental differences in sensation seeking and
perceptual appraisals of risk. The study had 236 participants, who were college students
at a Midwestern University. There were significant differences found between adults
aged 18-25 years, and those aged 26-34 years. The young adults aged 18-25 years were
found to engage in sensation seeking and risky behaviours significantly more than those
26-34 years old. Additionally, the 18-25 year olds perceived risky events as less harmful
than the 26-34 year olds. However, Todesco found no significant differences in the
participants’ level of unrealistic optimism in relation to their age group (18-25 years or
26-34 years), level of risk taking (high – low), or their sensation seeking (high-low).
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Anderson and Galinski (2006) investigated the role of perceived personal power in
optimism and risk-taking. They found that optimistic risk perceptions acted as a mediator
by increasing the effects of perceived personal power on risk-taking. This is relevant to
the current project, since the positive TAF construct refers to belief in positive outcomes
from positive thoughts, thus suggesting a form of personal power and an optimistic bias
about risk. Additionally, Anderson and Galinski found that a sense of responsibility for
others’ outcomes moderated the participants’ risk proclivity. Consequently, the personal
responsibility associated with TAF would probably influence the relationship between
positive TAF likelihood-others and risk through harm avoidance. These would reflect the
items from the Positive TAF harm avoidance subscales (e.g., “If I think of a
friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will have a car
accident”). This emphasizes the need to assess both gain and harm-reduction dimensions
of the likelihood-self and likelihood-other subscales for positive TAF when examining it
in relation to risky behaviours.
The Current Study
The current project contributes information to the literature about a phenomenon
that has never been studied as a distinct cognitive bias. Positive thought-action fusion
may help explain the pervasiveness of some risk-taking behaviour, such as that witnessed
with pathological gambling. In addition to the hypothesized relationship between positive
thought-action fusion and risk-taking behaviour, some additional analyses were also
included in Study 2, including further analysis of the positive TAF construct and the
Positive TAF Scale. Age and gender relationships were also examined to help guide
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future studies. There are several research questions being addressed in this study. These
questions are:
1) Is positive thought-action fusion associated with risk-taking in young
adulthood, and if so, how is it related?
2) Are the harm-avoidance subscales from the Positive TAF scale related to
cognitive distortions previously associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder?
3) Is positive thought-action fusion related to perceptions of risk and risky
behaviour?
4) Does positive thought-action fusion explain variance in risk-taking behaviour
above that explained by conceptually similar variables, such as belief in good
luck?
Hypotheses
H1: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and
expected future involvement in academic risk-taking behaviours.
H2: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and
expected future involvement in gambling behaviour.
H3: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and
expected future involvement in risky sexual behaviour.
H4: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and
expected future involvement in alcohol and drug use.
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H5: The positive gain subscales (self and other) of the Positive TAF scale will
share the strongest relationship with past and expected future involvement in risky
behaviour.
H6: The harm-avoidance subscales (self and other) will be associated with impaired
control over mental activities similar to the impaired control found with obsessivecompulsive disorder.
H7: Positive TAF will be inversely related to the participants’ perception of
possible negative risk.
H8: Positive TAF will be positively related to the participants’ perception of
possible positive consequences.
H9: Positive TAF will contribute to risk-taking behaviour above the participants’
belief in good luck, magical thinking, and spirituality.
Method
Participants
A sample of 273 students between the ages of 16 and 25 was obtained through the
Psychology participant pool (n = 261) and through a snowball recruitment procedure (n =
12). The use of a student sample is considered appropriate for the current research despite
concerns that have been raised about student research populations (e.g., Henry, 2008),
since cheating and other violations of academic integrity are best assessed in a population
from an academic setting. Furthermore, since youth and young adults are overrepresented
among those with risky behaviours (Todesco, 2005), they were the target age group for
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the current research project, and the predominant age range of the students in the
participant pool is representative of youth and young adults.
Exclusionary criteria for participant recruitment included age, as a sample
between the ages of 16 and 25 was preferred for this study. Participants must also have
been enrolled in a post-secondary institution in the Windsor-Essex County region to be
eligible for this study. These criteria for inclusion were meant to avoid the recruitment of
subsamples that are too small for analyses.
In addition to the advertisement through the Psychology participant pool,
recruitment included poster distribution around campus, as well as snowball recruitment.
Those recruited from the participant pool received 0.5 bonus points towards an eligible
Psychology course, and those recruited outside of the participant pool were compensated
with an opportunity to be entered into a draw for a one hundred dollar MasterCard © gift
card. The snowball recruitment was an attempt to increase the number of male
participants, since risk is more prevalent among males than females (Byrnes, Miller, &
Schafer, 1999), and the Psychology participant pool generally has a low proportion of
male volunteers.
Despite the efforts to increase male participation, the majority of participants in
Study 2 were female (females = 83.3%; males = 16.3%). There was a fairly diverse
ethnic representation of the student population (White / European = 72%, Black / African
/ Caribbean = 3%, Latin / South American = 1.5%, East Asian / Chinese / Japanese =
4.5%, South Asian / Indian / Pakistan = 4.9%, Aboriginal / Métis / Fist Nations = 1.1%,
Middle Eastern = 7.2%, Multiracial = 2.7%, Other = 2.7%).
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Measures
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P -TAF). This is a 26-item measure that
was developed for the current project. The validity of this measure was tested during
Study 1, which indicated internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) values that ranged from
acceptable to excellent (α = .71 to .91). This scale is used to assess the positive dimension
of the thought-action fusion phenomenon on a seven-point scale that ranges from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The P - TAF currently consists of five subscales:
Moral TAF, Likelihood-Others-Positive-Gain TAF, Likelihood-Self-Positive-Gain TAF,
Likelihood-Others-Harm-Avoidance TAF, and Likelihood-Self-Harm-Avoidance TAF
(Please see Appendix A).
Gambling Behaviour Survey. This survey contains questions to assess the
frequency of participants’ past gambling behaviours and expected future gambling
behaviours. Some of the items for this survey were taken from the Canadian Adolescent
Gambling Inventory (CAGI; Trembay, Weibe, Stinchfield, & Wynne, 2010), with
adjustments made to reflect gambling behaviours found in young adult populations. The
authors of the CAGI reported good internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s
alpha (α = .83 to α = .90). The gambling behaviours of interest for this study include
scratch tickets, lottery tickets, casino games, and internet gambling (Please see
Appendices M and N).
Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events. Fromme, Katz, and Rivet (1997) developed
the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale (CARE) to measure both perceived risk
and the participants’ expected involvement in risk behaviours. The authors were able to
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demonstrate content, construct, and criterion validity. The measure uses a seven-point
scale that ranges from “not at all likely” to “extremely likely.” Fromme and her
colleagues based the development of this scale on the idea that a risky activity is
something that could result in either a positive or negative consequence. For example,
missing class may have the expected benefit of having more time to work on
assignments, which could result in a higher grade. However, skipping class may also
have the expected risk of missing information that is required for the exam, which could
result in a lower grade. Fromme and her colleagues found that the expectation of possible
positive consequences was positively and reliably associated with the participants’
involvement in risky activities. For this reason, the CARE measurement includes three
scales, which are (1) Expected Risk, (2) Expected Benefit, and (3) Expected Involvement.
Each of these three scales is subdivided into risk domains, resulting in six Expected Risk
subscales, six Expected Benefit subscales, and six Expected Involvement subscales. In
the current study, only the subscales that assess risk perception and behaviour in the
domains of drug use, alcohol use, risky sexual behaviour, and risky academic behaviours
were of interest, so the subscales assessing aggressive / illegal behaviours and high-risk
sports were removed prior to testing.
To gain an accurate measure of the participants’ risky behaviour, an additional
scale was added to measure past involvement. This scale used the same items from the
Expected Risk, Expected Benefit, and Expected Involvement scales for the of drug use,
alcohol use, risky sexual behaviour, and risky academic behaviour subscales. The only
changes were that the prompt read “How often have you engaged in this activity in the
past year?” and it was scored on a 7-point scale that included Never, Once, Twice, Three
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times, Four times, Five times, and Six or more times. Please see Appendices O, P, Q, and
R for all CARE measures.
Padua Inventory. Sanavio (1988a) developed the 60-item Padua inventory as an
assessment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. The measure has four factors that assess
various obsessive-compulsive thought patterns and tendencies; however, the current
study only employed Factor 1(impaired control over mental activities), since this factor
has been associated with magical ideation and thought-action fusion in previous literature
(Einstein & Menzies, 2004). Factor 1 contains 17 items, such as “Unpleasant thoughts
come into my mind against my will and I cannot get rid of them.” Only the items from
Factor 1were measured for this project, as the remaining 43 items are not required for the
current study, and would have produced unnecessary fatigue effects for the participants.
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI). (Kingdon, Egan, & Rees, 2012). The IBI is a
24-item measure that assesses magical beliefs on a five-point scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The IBI has a three-factor structure including (1)
magical beliefs, (2) spirituality, and (3) internal state and thought-action fusion. Kingdon
and her colleagues reported that the IBI demonstrated excellent internal consistency
reliability for the overall scale (α = .93), and acceptable internal reliability for the
subscales (Magical Beliefs, α = .84; Spirituality, α = .87; Internal State, α = .75).
Examples of items include “I avoid unlucky numbers” from the Magical Beliefs subscale,
“There is an invisible force guiding us all” from the Spirituality subscale, and
“Sometimes I get a feeling that something is going to happen, before it happens” from the
Internal State subscale.
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Spirituality/Religiosity Scale. This instrument was developed by Good,
Willoughby, and Busseri (2011). It is an eight-item measure that assesses religiosity and
spirituality. Four questions use a five-point rating scale ranging from 1(never) to 5 (every
day), and three items use a five-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). One question uses a four-point scale from 1 (I never enjoy these activities) to 4 (I
usually enjoy these activities). To facilitate analysis, this item was scored on a five-point
scale in the current study by the addition of 5(I always enjoy these activities). The
Spirituality / Religiosity Scale contains such items as “In the past month, how often have
you prayed?”
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL). This instrument was developed by Darke
and Freedman (1997). It is a 15-item scale that measures the participants’ beliefs about
good luck on a six-point scale, with items such as “Some people are consistently lucky,
and others are unlucky,” and “I tend to win at games of chance.” The authors reported a
good internal consistency (α = .85), and provided evidence of convergent validity,
discriminant validity, and test-retest reliability.
Demographic Questionnaire. This demographic measure is for the purpose of
collecting information about the participants’ gender, age, SES, ethnicity, major, and year
of study. It was included for gender and age analyses, and for the purpose of describing
the sample.
Procedure
The study was administered online through FluidSurveys. It took approximately
20 - 25 minutes to complete the survey. The questions within each individual measure
36

were presented in a randomized order. The participants completed the Positive TAF
Scale, followed by the Gambling Behaviour Survey (with items from CAGI; Trembay,
Weibe, Stinchfield, & Wynne, 2010), the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale
(Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997), the Padua Inventory (Factor 1; Sanavio, 1988a), the
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (Kingdon, Egan, & Rees, 2012), The Spirituality / Religiosity
Scale (Good, Willoughby, & Busseri, 2011), the Belief in Good Luck Scale (Darke &
Freedman, 1997), and the Demographic Questionnaire.
Results
Data Analysis
Complete or partially complete data were obtained from participants using the
Psychology participant pool (n = 261), and a snowball recruitment method (n = 12), for a
total of 273 participants. One case was missing too much data to be useful for any
analyses, so it was removed. Some of the remaining cases (n = 11) had only completed
the first few scales; however, since the Positive TAF Scale was the first scale presented,
their data were complete for that scale, and were therefore retained for use in the
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Some other cases (n = 25) were missing one random
item on the Positive TAF Scale. Where there was any data missing at random, a multiple
imputation method was used to fill in the missing data. No significant differences were
found between the participants drawn from the Psychology participant pool and those
obtained using the snowball method for the individual items from the Positive TAF Scale.
Therefore, the participants were pooled for use in the EFA, resulting in a sample of 272
participants.

37

The data were then examined for use in the remaining analyses. There were eight
additional cases that were removed because they were missing information for at least
25% of the items. This resulted in 264 cases available for analyses.
The Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL) had two items that required reverse
coding (items 9 and 15), and the Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI) had seven items that
were reverse scored (items 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19). Scale scores were calculated for
all measures, and subscale scores were calculated for the CARE Scale and the IBI.
In addition, the CARE Alcohol Use and Drug Use subscales were combined into
one scale (Drinking and Drug use) by summing each of the two corresponding subscale
values. For example, expected future involvement for alcohol use was added to the
expected future involvement for drug use to result in the subscale labeled, Expected
Future Involvement Drinking and Drug Use. Subsequently, the Expected Future
Involvement subscales were combined with the Past Involvement subscales for all risk
behaviours (Gambling, Drinking and Drugs, Sexual, and Academic) to create total
behaviour subscales.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The assumptions for factor analysis are an adequate sample size, absence of
influential data points, normality, and absence of multicollinearity or singularity.
Normality was assessed using a combination of histograms and Q – Q plots, as well as
skew and kurtosis values. The histograms and Q – Q plots suggested that the data
approached normal, and the skew and kurtosis values were all within the acceptable range
(skew between -2 and 2; kurtosis between -3 and 3). To assess for influential data points,
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standardized z-scores were saved into the data file. Twelve of the z-scores (range = 3.39
to 4.18) exceeded Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) suggested cut-off z-score of 3.29, so
these twelve cases were removed. The remaining sample size for Study 2 (N = 260) met
the estimated requirement of ten cases per variable. Multicollinearity and singularity were
assessed using bivariate correlations, which showed significant correlations between most
items (please see Appendix D). The highest of the correlations (r = .77) was not high
enough to suggest singularity, but there was enough correlation between items (range r =
.09 to r = .77) to enable factor analysis.
Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test suggested the retention of three
factors. Examination of the SCREE plot suggested the retention of five factors. The
Kaiser Guttman rule (eigenvalue >1) suggested the retention of four factors. The
cumulative percentage of variance accounted for increased from three factors (56.04%) to
four factors (60.70%) and five factors (64.08%), and then slowed, only reaching the
desired 80% at eleven factors. The decision was made to analyze the data for five factors
as suggested by the SCREE plot, since these factors allowed for a fair amount of variance
accounted for, while still maintaining parsimony.
The exploratory factor analysis was performed using principal axis as the method
for factor extraction. A promax rotation was then used to account for the correlation
between items, while maximizing the interpretability of the factors. There were no crossloaded items present (please see Appendix E). The five factors that were produced were
different from those that had been hypothesized, but the new subscales did appear
conceptually relevant (please see Appendix F). Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the
internal reliability of the five factors, which resulted in Factor 1, Others (α = .91); Factor
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2, Self (α = .84); Factor 3, Financial Gain (α = .86); Factor 4, Moral (α = .75); and Factor
5, Ethical / Global Concern (α = .76). The internal reliability of the total scale was also
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α = .94). Item-level analyses indicated that the
reliability of either the total scale or the individual subscales would not be appreciably
increased by the removal of any specific items.
Independent Samples T-Tests
Gender and age differences were assessed using independent samples t tests. Age
was divided into categorical variables for the analyses, with the groups being defined as
older adolescents (16 – 19 years) and young adults (20 – 24 years). There was no
significant difference in the degree of positive thought-action fusion between adolescents
(n = 79, M = 66.96, SD = 23.50) and young adults (n = 181, M = 69.83, SD = 27.76);
t(258) = -.801, p = .424. There was also no significant difference in the degree of positive
thought-action fusion between males (n = 43, M = 71.58, SD = 30.19) and females (n =
220, M = 68.50, SD = 25.56); t(261) = .702, p = .483.
A statistically significant difference was found in risk-taking behaviour between
adolescents (n = 79, M = 114.61, SD = 35.82) and young adults (n = 181, M = 127.17, SD
= 46.92); t(191.923) = -2.356, p = .019. There was also a significant difference in risktaking behaviour between males (n = 43, M = 147.58, SD = 62.61) and females (n = 220,
M = 118.53, SD = 37.85); t(48.167) = 2.939, p = .005, with young adults and males
reporting higher levels of risk-taking behaviour.
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Correlational Analyses
Positive TAF and risk-taking behaviour. The assumption of linearity was
assessed by examination of bivariate scatterplots, which all suggested linear relationships
between the various forms of risk and the Positive TAF scale and subscales. Two
participants were removed, as they were identified as influential outliers. The assumption
of approximated normal distributions was supported by both normality plots and skew
and kurtosis values for all variables except the sexual behaviour subscale. The sexual
behaviour subscale was transformed, which corrected the normality violation (skew =
1.64, kurtosis = 1.82). Please see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and Table 3 for
correlational results.
The results from the correlational analyses indicate that there is a statistically
significant positive relationship between positive thought-action fusion and gambling, as
well as between positive thought-action fusion and sexual risk-taking behaviour. These
results provide support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. However, Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 4 were not supported in this study, as there were no significant relationships
between positive TAF and academic risk or alcohol / drug use.
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Study 2

Cronbach’s

N

M

SD

P-TAF Total Scale

262

68.50

25.84

.94

P-TAF Other Subscale

262

22.34

11.07

.91

P-TAF Self Subscale

262

22.58

8.25

.84

P-TAF Financial Gain Subscale

262

8.07

4.93

.86

P-TAF Moral Subscale

262

7.76

3.88

.75

P-TAF Ethical/Global Concern Subscale

262

7.76

4.19

.76

Gambling Behaviour

262

42.98

18.83

.89

Academic Risk

262

30.22

13.11

.89

Sexual Risk

262

16.53

8.27

.75

Drinking and Drug Behaviour

262

33.00

19.02

.92

Total Risk Behaviour

262

122.73

42.70

.92

Perceived Academic Consequences

263

26.39

6.84

.88

Perceived Sexual Consequences

263

35.11

8.06

.90

Perceived Alcohol / Drug Consequences

263

29.69

8.98

.88

Perceived Academic Benefits

263

8.01

3.95

.81

Perceived Sexual Benefits

263

9.66

5.62

.86

Perceived Alcohol / Drug Benefits

263

13.52

7.91

.89

Padua Factor 1

261

36.55

12.30

.91
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Table 3 Correlations between P-TAF and Risk Variables
1
1. P-TAF Other
2. P-TAF Self
3. P-TAF Financial
Gain
4. P-TAF Moral
5. P-TAF Ethical/
Global
6. P-TAF Total
7. Gambling
8. Academic
9. Alcohol-Drugs
10. Sexual Risk
11. Total Risk

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

.48**

-

.72**

.40**

-

.51**

.38**

.49**

-

.66**

.42**

.69**

.56**

-

.90**

.73**

.81**

.68**

.79**

-

.18**

.18**

.28**

.15*

.23**

.25**

-.03

.02

.05

-.01

.08

.01

.23**

-

-.01

.09

.04

-.01

.09

.04

.39**

.36**

-

.16*

.16*

.26**

.20**

.24**

.24**

.36**

.20**

.50**

-

.10

.15*

.20**

.10

.21**

.18**

.75**

.61**

.82**

.63**

-

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Note:
Gambling = Participants’ past and expected future gambling behaviour
Academic = Participants’ past and expected future academic risk-taking behaviour
Alcohol-Drugs = Participants’ past and expected future drug and alcohol use
Sexual Risk = Participants’ past and expected future sexual risk-taking behaviour
Total Risk = Total participants’ past and expected future risk-taking behaviour
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Positive TAF and risk perception. Bivariate scatterplots suggested linear
relationships between the P -TAF scale and all forms (academic, sexual, and drinking /
drugs) of negative and positive risk perception. One case was removed after being
identified as an influential outlier. Please refer back to Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
Normality plots and skew and kurtosis values indicated that the distributions approached
normality for all variables except those involving the positive and negative perceptions of
sexual risk. These variables were transformed, which corrected the normality violation
for positive perceptions of sexual risk (skew = 1.15, kurtosis = 0.14), but not for the
negative perceptions of sexual risk (skew = 3.39, kurtosis = 12.54). Therefore,
Spearman’s rho was used for analyses involving the negative perception of sexual risk, as
it converts the variables to ranked data and is robust to violations of normality.
No statistically significant relationships were found between positive TAF and
perceptions of academic consequences, negative sexual consequences, or alcohol / drug
consequences. Therefore, this study did not support Hypothesis 7, which had proposed
that positive TAF would be inversely related to the participants’ perception of possible
negative risk. Similarly, no statistically significant relationships were found between
positive TAF and academic benefits, sexual benefits, or alcohol / drug benefits.
Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was also not supported, as it had proposed that positive TAF
would be positively related to the participants’ perception of possible positive
consequences. Please see Table 4 for all correlational results between positive TAF and
perceptions of risk.
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Table 4 Correlations between P-TAF and Perceived Risk

1

1. P-TAF Total Scale

2

3

4

5

6

7

-

2. Perceived Academic Consequences

-.11

-

3. Perceived Sexual Consequences

-.04

.51**

-

4. Perceived Alcohol / Drug Consequences

-.03

.63**

.71**

5. Perceived Academic Benefits

.11

-.30**

-.15*

-.10

6. Perceived Sexual Benefits

.06

-.11

-.52**

-.29**

.45**

-

7. Perceived Alcohol / Drug Benefits

.02

-.13*

-.38**

-.44**

.40**

.75**

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)
Bolded values are Spearman’s rho correlational values
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-

-

Positive TAF and impaired control over mental activities. The assumption of
linear relationships was supported by bivariate scatterplots of the Padua Inventory Factor
1 Scale with the Positive TAF scale and all P-TAF subscales. Three cases were removed
after being identified as influential outliers. The assumption of normal distributions was
supported by both normality plots and skew and kurtosis values for all variables. Please
refer back to Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
Correlations between the Padua Inventory Factor 1 and Positive TAF are shown
in Table 5. There were statistically significant relationships between the Padua Inventory
Factor 1 subscale and the Positive TAF scale, as well as between the Padua Inventory
Factor 1 subscale and each of the P-TAF subscales. Hypothesis 6 had proposed a
relationship between the Padua subscale and the P-TAF Harm Avoidance subscales, but
the exploratory factor analysis conducted earlier in the study did not support the existence
of P-TAF Harm Avoidance subscales. Even though these results could not support
Hypothesis 6 directly, they did indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists
between the impaired control of mental activities and positive TAF.
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Table 5 Correlations between P-TAF and Impaired Control over Mental Activities

1

1. Padua Factor 1
2. P-TAF Total Scale
3. P-TAF Other subscale
4. P-TAF Self subscale
5. P-TAF Financial Gain subscale
6. P-TAF Moral subscale
7. P-TAF Ethical/Global Concern

2

3

4

5

6

7

-

.24**

-

.21**

.90**

-

.19**

.72**

.48**

-

.17**

.81**

.72**

.40**

-

.18**

.67**

.51**

.37**

.49**

-

.

.22**

.80**

.66**

.42**

.69**

.56**

-

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)
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Hierarchical Regression Analysis
All forms of risk-taking behaviour from this study (gambling behaviour, academic
risk-taking, alcohol / drug use, and sexual risk-taking behaviour) were combined to
provide a total risk-taking score for use in the hierarchical regression analysis. A
composite outcome measure was used because running separate regression analyses for
each outcome measure did not yield parsimonious solutions that explained sufficient
variance. The predictor variables (belief in good luck, magical thinking, and spirituality)
were chosen for the hierarchical regression analyses based on the strength of their
relationships to positive TAF in Study 1. However, correlational analyses in Study 2
revealed that magical thinking (as measured by the illusory beliefs inventory) was not
significantly related to the outcome variable, risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, it was
removed from the analysis. Please see Table 6 for the correlational relationships between
the variables.
Plotting of the standardized predicted Y on the standardized residuals indicated
that the assumption of linearity was not violated. A slight fanning pattern on the plot
indicated a minimal amount of heteroscedasticity, and the distribution also indicated a
violation of normality. Bootstrapping (1000 samples) was used to correct the violation of
normality, which once corrected, rendered the test robust to heteroscedasticity. The
Durbin-Watson value (Durbin-Watson = 1.851) was within the required range, indicating
independence of errors. Both tolerance and VIF indicated the absence of
multicollinearity and singularity (tolerance > .1; VIF < 10). Six outliers on X were
identified (standardized residuals > 2.5), and five outliers on Y (Mahalanobis distance >
13.277) were also identified. Three of these cases were found to be influential
48

observations (COOKS >1; DFFIT >2). The decision was made to remove all outliers /
influential observations prior to analysis. The final sample size (N = 255) was larger than
the required (N = 60) sample size for this analysis.
The Spirituality / Religiosity Scale score (M = 17.55, SD = 5.44), and Belief in
Good Luck Scale score (M = 42.61, SD = 10.26) were entered in the first block. The
Positive TAF Scale score (M = 67.80, SD = 25.18) was entered as the second block.
The first step in the model was significant for spirituality and religiosity, and
belief in good luck, R2 = .10, F(2, 251) = 14.12, p < .001. There was also a statistically
significant change when positive TAF was entered into the model, R2 = .13, ΔR2 = .03,
ΔF(1, 250) = 7.15, p = .008. Please see Table 7 for further details from the analysis.
These results support Hypothesis 9, in that positive TAF did contribute to risk-taking
behaviour above the participants’ belief in good luck and their spirituality.
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Table 6 Correlations between all Variables Considered for use in Hierarchical Analyses
1

1. Total Positive TAF

2

3

4

5

-

2. Total IBI Scale

.49**

-

3. Spirituality and Religiosity Scale

.27**

.57**

4. Belief in Good Luck Scale

.41**

.54**

.15*

5. Total Risk

.13*

-.11

-.27**

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed)
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.13*

-

Table 7 Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Cognitive Predictors of Total
Risk Behaviour

N = 254
B

SE B

β

R2

ΔR2

-.24

.45

-.33

.10

.10

.42

.25

.11

.13

.03

Step 1
Spirituality/Religiosity
Belief in Good Luck

Step 2
Positive TAF

.28

51

.11

.18

Study 2 Discussion
To expand on the psychometric analyses from Study 1, the subscale structure of
the Positive TAF Scale was examined using an exploratory factor analysis. The
hypothesized subscale structure was not fully supported by the analysis, even though it
maintained the existence of five subscales. The internal consistency values for the new
subscales (1-Self; 2-Others; 3-Financial Gain; 4-Moral; 5-Ethical / Global) ranged from
good (.7 ≤ α < .9) to excellent (.9 ≤ α), supporting the new subscale structure.
Following the factor analysis, the Moral subscale retained the same items from
the hypothesized Moral subscale, and remained unchanged. However, the Self and Others
subscales did not retain their separate personal-gain and harm-avoidance features that had
been present in the hypothesized structure, with Others Gain, Others Harm-Avoidance,
Self – Gain, and Self Harm-Avoidance each classifying a separate subscale. Instead, the
new Self and Others subscales contain a number of items that collectively represent both
gain and avoidance. The items that did not factor into the new Self and Others subscales
formed two subscales that had not been present in the hypothesized subscale structure.
These new subscales were the Financial Gain subscale, and the Ethical / Global Concern
subscale. The Financial Gain subscale contains items that describe situations that would
financially benefit a person, such as winning the lottery or becoming a millionaire. The
Ethical / Global Concern subscale contains items such as “If I think of myself getting
away with cheating, this increases the chance that I will get away with cheating,” and
“When I hear news reports of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world
peace.”
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Further psychometric evaluation investigated the relationship between impaired
control of mental activities and the harm-avoidance subscales (self and other). There was
some difficulty in testing this hypothesis (Hypothesis 6), since harm-avoidance subscales
were not supported by the exploratory factor analysis. Even though the hypothesis could
not be tested as stated, statistically significant relationships were found between impaired
control of mental activities and the total P-TAF Scale, as well as with all five of the new
subscales. In describing his cognitive theory of obsessions, Rachman (1977) defines
obsessions as being the result of catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of
personal thoughts. The Padua Inventory Factor 1 Subscale was designed expressly to
measure the impaired control of mental activities that is associated with obsessivecompulsive disorder (Sanavio, 1988b). It follows that the relationship of positive TAF to
the Padua Factor 1 subscale highlights the cognitive distortions involved in positive TAF,
which indicates that positive TAF may have a possible relationship with obsessivecompulsive tendencies, or even with obsessive-compulsive disorder.
The gender and age of the participants was analyzed to help guide future research.
The gender of the participants was not related to their level of positive thought-action
fusion, but it was found to be related to their risk-taking behaviour, with males reporting
more risk-taking behaviour than females. This relationship between gender and risktaking is consistent with the research reported by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999).
These authors conducted a meta-analysis of 150 studies, and concluded that males were
much more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviours; particularly, risky behaviours that
were intellectual or physical in nature.
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Similarly, the age of the participants was not related to their level of positive
thought-action fusion, but it was found to be related to their risk-taking behaviour, with
older adolescents reporting more risk-taking behaviour than young adults. This
relationship between age and risky behaviour is consistent with past research (Todesco,
2005), which found that risk-taking behaviours in this age range are highest in
adolescence and decrease into young adulthood.
If age and gender were involved in mediating the relationship between positive
TAF and risk, a relationship would be expected between positive TAF and these
variables. The findings from Study 2 suggest that age and gender are not involved in
mediation, but rather that they influence risk-taking behaviour independently of the
positive TAF construct.
Correlational analyses were used to test Hypotheses 1 through 4, which looked at
the association between positive TAF and the various forms of risk that were examined in
this study. The results only supported two of these hypotheses (H2 and H3), in that
positive TAF was significantly related to gambling behaviour and risky sexual behaviour,
but not to academic risk-taking or alcohol / drug use. The relationship between gambling
and positive TAF is consistent with the past research by Barrault and Varescon (2012),
who found that people with irrational beliefs had a propensity to overestimate their
control over the outcome of gambling events, and that pathological gamblers had a higher
prevalence of cognitive distortions. However, the overall results from this study, which
indicate a relationship between positive TAF with some forms of risk-taking but not
others, were unexpected. Since gambling is, by definition, risk-taking, a positive
association between positive TAF and gambling behaviour would suggest an association
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between positive TAF and other forms of risk-taking behaviour. It is possible that
mediating factors are involved for these other forms of risk-taking that were not
addressed in the current study. For example, the participants’ personalities and affect are
possible mediating factors that may influence the relationship between positive TAF and
risky behaviour. As detailed earlier, there is a great deal of variability in the extent to
which these forms of behaviour (gambling, alcohol / drug use, sexual activity, and
academic behaviours) can be participated in, while still avoiding the associated risk. The
participants’ personalities and affect may influence the relationship between positive
TAF and the degree to which they are motivated to engage in these activities.
Hypothesis 5 examined the relationship between risky behaviours and the Positive
Gain subscales (self and other). This hypothesis could not be tested, since the
exploratory factor analysis did not support the existence of positive gain or harm
avoidance subscales. However, the analyses did indicate that gambling behaviour shared
the highest relationships with the Financial Gain subscale and the total P-TAF scale,
followed closely by the Ethical / Global Concern subscale. The relationship between
gambling and the Financial Gain subscale is expected, since this subscale includes items
such as, “If I think of myself winning while scratching lottery tickets, it will increase the
chance of winning,” and “If I think of myself winning the lottery, this increases my
chance of winning the lottery.” The relationship between gambling and the Total P-TAF
Scale was also expected, since the scale indicates a general belief that personal thoughts
can influence positive outcomes. However, a strong relationship between gambling and
the Ethical / Global Concern subscale was not expected. This scale includes items such
as, “When I hear news of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world
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peace.” It is possible that the relationship between gambling and ethical / global concern
comes from the positive TAF bias being generalized to a variety of thought processes.
Further investigation will be needed to delineate this relationship.
Risky sexual behaviour shared the strongest relationships with the total P-TAF
scale and the Ethical / Global concern subscale, followed by the Financial Gain subscale
and Self subscale. Similar to the findings with gambling behaviour, the strong
relationship between risky sexual behaviour and the Total Positive TAF scale could be
expected, due to the associated cognitive bias in which people believe that their thoughts
can positively influence outcomes. A strong relationship between risky sexual behaviour
and the Self subscale could also be expected, as this scale includes items such as, “If I
think about being attractive, it will make my desired partner more attracted to me.” The
strong relationships involving risky sexual behaviour with the Ethical / Global Concern
subscale and the Financial Gain subscale were not expected. As with the relationship
between gambling and ethical / global concern, it is possible that the positive TAF bias
has generalized to various thought processes, influencing the relationships between risky
sexual behaviour and ethical / global concern and financial gain.
Correlational analyses were also used to test the relationship between positive
TAF and risk perception (H7 and H8). Perceptions of the risks and benefits associated
with gambling were not investigated in the current study, but there were no statistically
significant relationships found between positive TAF and the participants’ perceptions of
the risks or benefits associated with academic risk, sexual risk, or alcohol and drug use. It
is possible that people who experience the positive TAF bias perceive the same amount
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of inherent risk in activities as people without cognitive bias; yet, they feel that the risks
will not affect them, because their thoughts will overrule the inherent risks.
Hierarchical regression analyses were used to investigate (H9) whether positive
TAF contributed to risk-taking behaviour above some of the constructs that were shown
to be closely related to Positive TAF in Study 1 (belief in good luck and spirituality). All
forms of risk behaviour (gambling, sexual risk-taking, academic risk-taking, and alcohol /
drug use) from this study were summed to produce one total risk value to be used as the
outcome variable for these analyses. Approximately 3% of the risk-taking behaviour from
this sample could be attributed to positive TAF after belief in good luck and spirituality
were accounted for. Although 3% is not a large percentage, it shows that positive TAF
does account for some of the risk-taking behaviour in a university sample. Past work by
Barrault and Varescon (2012) indicated that cognitive distortions are more common
among pathological gamblers. Future investigations into positive TAF could assess
clinical populations, such as pathological gamblers, to examine if the positive TAF
contributes equally to risk-taking behaviours in clinical populations.
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Chapter Three
General Discussion
Positive thought-action fusion was investigated in this project as a distinct
cognitive bias. Past investigations with the thought-action fusion construct had
maintained a focus on the belief that negative outcomes could occur as a result of
personal thoughts. Alternatively, the positive TAF construct focuses on the belief that
positive outcomes can occur as a result of personal thoughts. These two cognitive biases
are related, but conceptually distinct. Where the thought-action fusion bias is implicated
in the individual’s obsessive desire to avoid the negative outcomes believed to result
from their thoughts, the positive TAF bias is hypothesized to increase personal desire to
obtain the positive outcomes that they believe result from their thoughts.
The P-TAF Scale was designed to fundamentally emulate Shafran, Thordarson,
and Rachman’s TAF-R Scale (1996b), in order to maintain the focus on measuring
cognitive bias. The relationship between the P-TAF and the TAF-R helps to provide
evidence for construct validity of the P-TAF Scale. However, evidence was also gained
to show that the cognitive bias that is measured by the P-TAF is distinct from the
cognitive bias measured by the TAF-R, due to the P-TAF focus on positive outcomes.
The P-TAF gained support for convergent validity in Study 1 through its
relationships with several conceptually similar phenomena. Yet, none of these
relationships were strong enough to suggest that positive TAF was not a distinct
construct. The P-TAF scale was refined in Study 2 after a factor analysis revealed a five-
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factor subscale structure that included a Self subscale, Other subscale, Financial Gain
subscale, Moral subscale, and Ethical / Global Concern subscale.
In Study 2, the P-TAF was employed to measure positive TAF’s relationship to
perceptions of risk, risky behaviours, and impaired control of mental activities. While
there were no statistically significant findings to support a relationship between positive
TAF and perceptions of risk, there was evidence gained in support of the hypothesized
relationship between positive TAF and some forms of risky behaviours, and there was
support for a relationship between positive TAF and impaired mental control.
Young people’s engagement in risk-taking behaviours can alter their life
trajectory. In some cases, these life-changing risks could be beneficial, such as in the case
of a person quitting a steady job to pursue an interest that turns out to be far more
enjoyable and profitable than the original job. However, in other circumstances, the
person’s life trajectory could change for the worse, such as when participation in
gambling becomes an addiction. The identification of positive TAF and its relationship to
some forms of risk-taking behaviour could lead to enhanced understanding of these
behaviours, which could lead to improved intervention strategies.
Limitations
The current project involved two studies, which were designed to act as merely
the starting point for investigations into the positive thought-action fusion phenomenon.
Since the current project represents the first stage of research for this cognitive bias,
investigation was limited to psychometric exploration of the scale, and the exploration of
a limited number of risky behaviours. Therefore, the sample represented only two age
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groups, which were drawn completely from post-secondary institutions in one geographic
area, which may not provide a sample that represents the general population (Sears,
1986). Furthermore, the participation rate of males was disproportionately low. This may
have increased the possibility of Type II errors in Study 2, since both current and past
research (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) have identified gender differences in risktaking behaviour. Another limitation that was specific to Study 2 is that it did not explore
the participants’ perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with gambling
behaviour, since gambling was not included in the forms of risky behaviour assessed by
the CARE Scale. Despite these limitations, this research was successful in demonstrating
that positive thought-action fusion is a distinct cognitive bias, and that we have a valid
scale with which to measure it. It has also provided evidence that this cognitive bias
contributes to some forms of risk-taking behaviours and impaired mental control.
Applications and Future Directions
At the onset of this project, it was theorized that positive TAF would be
implicated in social phenomena, rather than in the clinical disorders that have been
associated with Rachman’s thought-action fusion bias (1993). However, the results from
these studies, particularly, the relationship between positive TAF and the impaired
control of mental activities, suggest that positive TAF may also be implicated in some
clinical disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder and anxiety.
The relationship between positive thought-action fusion and impaired control of
mental activities (as measured by Factor 1 of the Padua Inventory) suggests that positive
TAF may also be related to obsessive-compulsive tendencies, since the Padua Inventory
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was developed specifically for the assessment of OCD (Sanavio, 1988b). Further
indication of a possible relationship between positive TAF and OCD is suggested by the
fact that the relationship between OCD and the original TAF construct has been well
documented (e.g., Berle & Starcevic, 2005), and positive TAF was found to be correlated
with the original thought-action fusion bias in Study 1.
MacLeod and Mathews (2012) discuss how various cognitive models of anxiety
generally share the premise that cognitive biases play a central causal role in people’s
vulnerability to experience unduly intense anxiety symptoms. The current project
revealed that positive TAF is related to the original thought-action fusion construct, as
well as impaired control of mental abilities, both of which have been associated with
some people’s tendency to assume exaggerated responsibility for their personal thoughts
(Rachman, 1993). This tendency toward exaggerated responsibility has been associated
with anxiety in past literature (see Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Taken together, these
relationships suggest that there may be a possible link between positive TAF and anxiety.
Future research could include samples drawn from clinical populations to investigate the
true relationship between positive TAF and anxiety, OCD, gambling addictions, and
other disorders.
Cognitive bias modification (CBM) is often used as an intervention strategy to
help people who display symptoms associated with cognitive biases. Unlike cognitivebehaviour therapy (CBT), which seeks to alter the way that individuals respond to
anxiety-provoking thoughts, Cognitive bias modification (CBM) seeks to change
individual cognitive patterns to stop the anxiety-provoking thoughts from occurring.
MacLeod and Mathews (2012) state that most research regarding CBM has focused on
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attentional bias and interpretative bias, but that the principles underlying the CBM
approach could be extended to other types of cognitive biases, as well. Since
interventions have already been developed for other cognitive biases, future research
could investigate whether these same interventions could be extended to help people who
are distressed by positive TAF.
Other directions for future research include expanding on current findings, such as
exploring the relationship between positive TAF and risk-taking behaviour further by
investigating possible mediating factors, such as personality and affect. Another possible
mediating factor is motivational state. Differences in people’s motivation to participate in
certain activities may influence the relationship between the positive TAF bias and actual
participation in risky behaviours. For example, although participation in some forms of
risky behaviour may provide an immediate benefit, such as financial gain from gambling,
some people may not be motivated to participate in gambling because they are more
focused on long-term goals. Information about possible mediating factors will help to
delineate the differences found in the associations between positive TAF and the various
forms of risk-taking behaviour.
Another avenue for future research is the investigation of positive TAF in relation
to various forms of positive risk-taking behaviour, such as the personal risk involved in
many heroic acts, or the financial risk involved in developing innovations. Research on
resilience factors may also benefit from future investigations of the positive TAF
construct; particularly, if a relationship is found between positive TAF and positive risktaking behaviour. Any increase in the propensity for people to take positive risks, may
increase their resilience through a decreased feeling of helplessness. Additionally,
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spirituality and religion have been associated with resilience in past studies (e.g.,
Resnick, Harris & Blum, 1993), and this association may be influenced by the
relationship between positive TAF and spirituality.
The field of Military Psychology may also benefit from further research on the
relationship between positive TAF and positive risk-taking behaviour, as well as its
possible association with resilience. Military work requires a significant amount of
personal risk-taking, and the relationship between positive TAF and positive risk-taking
behaviour may contribute to the knowledge base of factors involved in taking these
personal risks. In addition, Wooten (2012) found that the relationship between stressors
and post-traumatic stress symptoms was fully mediated by resilience factors.
Future research could also pursue further analyses of the relationship between
positive thought-action fusion and risk perception. Although Study 2 did not produce any
significant findings concerning the quantity of risk perceptions by the participants, it is
possible that risks are perceived qualitatively different by people who experience the
positive TAF cognitive distortion. Study 2 only investigated whether people with positive
TAF perceived more or less risk than others. However, it is possible that people with the
positive TAF bias perceive risk differently. A qualitative study may be able to identify
specific differences in the way that people perceive the risks associated with various
activities. The identification of key components from the positive TAF bias, such as
qualitative differences in risk perception, can be used to refine the development of risk
interventions. It is only through further investigation of factors that contribute to risky
decision-making that we can hope to prevent the negative outcomes that can result from
some forms of risk-taking behaviour.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (Craig, J. C., 2013)

Please indicate the extent that you agree with the following statements
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

If I think of a sick relative /
friend getting better, this
increases the chance that
they will get well.
If I think of myself
winning a competition, it
increases the chance that I
will win.
If I think of myself
winning the lottery, this
increases my chance of
winning the lottery.
If I think of my car
running well, it decreases
the chance that my car will
break down.
If I think of myself getting
away with cheating, this
increases the chance that I
will get away with cheating
If I think of a relative/friend
finding a new job, this
increases the chance that
they will get a new job.

If I think about my pet
staying healthy, it
increases the chance that
they will stay healthy.
Thinking of someone else
being successful increases
the chance that they will be
successful.
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Somewhat

Strongly

Agree

Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

If I think about winning, it
decreases the chance of me
losing
If I think of a friend/relative
winning the lottery, this
increases the chance that
they will win the lottery.

If I think of myself in a
higher position at work, it
increases the chance that I
will get a promotion.
If I think of myself as
being popular, it will make
me have more friends.
Thinking about helping
someone else is almost the
same as actually helping
someone.
If I think of my friend /
relative winning an award, it
increases the chance that
they will win an award.

When I have a kind
thought about someone
else, it is almost as good as
paying them a compliment.
If I think about the end of
global warming, it will
increase the chance that
global warming will end.
When I am sick, if I think
about getting better, it
increases the chance that I
will get better.
If I think of being a
millionaire, there is a
better chance that I will get
a million dollars
If I think of a friend/
relative avoiding a car
accident, this decreases the
chance that they will have
a car accident
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Somewhat

Strongly

Agree

Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

If I think about animals
being friendly, it decreases
the chance that I will be
attacked by an animal
If I think of myself
winning while scratching
lottery tickets, it will
increase the chance of
winning
When I hear news reports
of peace talks, I know that
it is because I thought
about world peace.
If I think of a
friend/relative getting
home safely, this increases
the likelihood that they
will get home safely.
If I think about being
attractive, it will make my
desired partner more
attracted to me
Having an honourable
thought is almost as good
as doing an honourable
deed.
If I think that I won’t get
caught speeding, it
increases the chance that I
will get away with
speeding.
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Somewhat

Agree

Strongl
y Agree

Appendix B Descriptive Information of Study 1Measures
Scale

Range
min.

Range
max.

APNI positive subscale

16

56

APNI negative subscale

14

SD

Skew

43.52

7.821

-1.022

1.431

55

39.96

7.822

-.622

.456

-35

40

3.55

11.275

-.252

2.322

20

76

46.86

10.748

-.420

.038

Hope Pathways subscale

6

16

12.20

1.788

-.362

.943

Hope Agency subscale

5

16

12.15

2.119

-.427

.899

Hope Scale Total

14

32

24.35

3.471

-.220

.686

IBI magical beliefs subscale

10

48

24.00

6.609

.088

.215

IBI spirituality subscale

9

44

28.33

6.883

-.242

-.141

IBI Internal State and TAF subscale

5

25

14.28

4.170

-.223

-.207

31

100

66.61

14.316

-.460

-.055

0

24

8.14

5.369

.788

.240

16

36

28.82

3.801

-1.020

1.501

Positive TAF moral subscale

3

21

9.71

3.924

.304

-.452

Positive TAF Likelihood Others Positive Gain subscale

5

35

13.15

6.896

.681

-.359

Positive TAF Likelihood Others Harm Avoidance subscale

5

35

11.68

5.936

.904

.730

Positive TAF Likelihood Self Positive Gain subscale

8

56

27.35

9.691

.001

-.272

Positive TAF Likelihood Self Harm Avoidance subscale

5

35

13.42

5.878

.661

.439

26

182

75.32

28.588

.479

.271

8

36

19.01

6.558

.394

-.432

12

60

33.74

11.117

.008

-.337

TAF Likelihood Others subscale

3

20

7.72

3.331

.809

.564

TAF Likelihood Self subscale

3

15

6.81

2.823

.336

-.596

Thought-Action Fusion Total

19

95

48.28

14.707

-.072

.058

(N = 198)

APNI total scale (pos minus neg)
Belief in Good Luck Scale

IBI Total scale
Magical Ideation Scale Total
Positivity Scale Total

Positive Thought-Action Fusion Total
Spirituality and Religiosity Scale
TAF moral subscale
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Mean

Kurtosis

Appendix C Correlations of Positive Thought-Action Fusion with Conceptually
Similar Constructs

Hope
Hope Agency
Hope Pathways
BIGL
Religiosity
Positivity
MIS
TAF – R Total
TAF – R Moral
TAF – R Others
TAF – R Self
IBI Total
IBI Internal
State
IBI Spirituality
IBI Magical
APNI Total
APNI Positive
APNI Negative

r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p

Positive
TAF Scale

Moral
Subscale

Other
Gain
Subscale

Other
Harm Avoidance
Subscale

Self Gain
Subscale

Self
Harm–
Avoidance
Subscale

.119
.094
.068
.343
.152*
.033
.419**
.000
.360**
.000
.025
.725
.505**
.000
.574**
.000
.430**
.000
.567**
.000
.627**
.000
.529**
.000
.572**
.000
.266**
.000
.507**
.000
.032
.653
.116
.104
.070
.330

.031
.666
.025
.724
.030
.674
.321**
.000
.300**
.000
.015
.831
.348**
.000
.432**
.000
.343**
.000
.392**
.000
.434**
.000
.391**
.000
.406**
.000
.223**
.002
.358**
.000
-.045
.533
.003
.970
.067
.348

.033
.642
-.018
.803
.086
.230
.392**
.000
.295**
.000
-.003
.970
.462**
.000
.492**
.000
.353**
.000
.560**
.000
.511**
.000
.474**
.000
.506**
.000
.244**
.001
.452**
.000
.015
.833
.093
.191
.071
.317

.081
.255
.050
.483
.098
.168
.401**
.000
.320**
.000
.030
.676
.462**
.000
.543**
.000
.397**
.000
.590**
.000
.566**
.000
.451**
.000
.489**
.000
.189**
.008
.473**
.000
-.005
.944
.093
.191
.101
.159

.197**
.005
.147*
.038
.209**
.003
.350**
.000
.349**
.000
.025
.727
.436**
.000
.527**
.000
.411**
.000
.437**
.000
.611**
.000
.491**
.000
.515**
.000
.297**
.000
.430**
.000
.086
.231
.156*
.028
.033
.646

.114
.111
.039
.581
.174*
.014
.382**
.000
.307**
.000
.044
.538
.498**
.000
.509**
.000
.370**
.000
.520**
.000
.581**
.000
.488**
.000
.576**
.000
.175*
.014
.512**
.000
.032
.651
.101
.158
.054
.449
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Appendix D Bivariate Correlations of items from the Positive TAF Scale
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Appendix E Factor Loadings for Positive TAF Scale

Variable

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

Communality
Estimates

P-TAF 4

.672

.060

.266

.046

-.147

.710

P-TAF 5

.904

.122

-.096

-.087

-.047

.632

P-TAF 7

.577

.041

.236

.047

-.025

.653

P-TAF 8

.609

.129

.027

.073

-.057

.519

P-TAF 9

.817

-.227

-.024

.003

.109

.618

P-TAF 11

.927

-.062

.006

.045

-.177

.649

P-TAF 13

.578

.148

-.064

-.073

.210

.536

P-TAF 23

.420

-.044

.200

-.084

.335

.607

P-TAF 26

.339

.278

-.087

.053

.106

.380

P-TAF 16

-.012

.814

.068

-.076

-.042

.553

P-TAF 21

-.190

.699

.163

.045

-.057

.423

P-TAF 15

.040

.689

-.026

.004

.063

.502

P-TAF 18

.104

.688

-.111

.032

-.056

.486

P-TAF 17

-.012

.570

-.180

.086

.234

.463

P-TAF 25

.155

.523

.073

-.015

.015

.457

P-TAF 20

.103

.059

.821

-.141

.013

.691

P-TAF 6

.138

-.049

.794

.096

-.072

.744

P-TAF 14

.105

-.061

.755

-.055

.093

.689

P-TAF 19

-.129

.259

.331

.035

.282

.424

P-TAF 1

.050

-.012

-.199

.842

.016

.478

P-TAF 2

-.027

-.055

.159

.533

.154

.502

P-TAF 3

-.018

.130

.081

.690

-.154

.423

P-TAF 22

-.150

.132

-.023

-.078

.793

.449

P-TAF 10

.165

-.070

.131

.215

.320

.498

P-TAF 12

.050

-.014

.255

.121

.374

.491

P-TAF 24

.155

-.108

.091

.013

.603

.527

Total
Communality
Estimate
Variance (%)
explained by
each factor
Hyperplane
Count

14.104

40.014

10.330

5.694

4.666

3.371

7

11

12

20

12

79

(47.69 %)

Appendix F Subscale Structure of the Positive TAF Scale

Factor 1: TAF Others
4. If I think of a relative/friend finding a new job, this increases the chance that they will get a new
job.
5. If I think of a sick relative/friend getting better, this increases the chance that they will get well.
7. If I think of my friend/relative winning an award, it increases the chance that they will win an
award.
8. Thinking of someone else being successful increases the chance that they will be successful.
9. If I think of a friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will have
a car accident
11. If I think of a friend/relative getting home safely, this increases the likelihood that they will get
home safely.
13. If I think about my pet staying healthy, it increases the chance that they will stay healthy.
23. If I think of my car running well, it decreases the chance that my car will break down.
26. If I think about animals being friendly, it decreases the chance that I will be attacked by an animal
Factor 2: TAF Self
16. If I think of myself winning a competition, it increases the chance that I will win.
21. If I think about being attractive, it will make my desired partner more attracted to me
15. If I think of myself in a higher position at work, it increases the chance that I will get a
promotion.
18. When I am sick, if I think about getting better, it increases the chance that I will get better.
17. If I think of myself as being popular, it will make me have more friends.
25. If I think about winning, it decreases the chance of me losing
Factor 3: TAF Financial Gain
20. If I think of myself winning while scratching lottery tickets, it will increase the chance of winning
6. If I think of a friend/relative winning the lottery, this increases the chance that they will win the
lottery.
14. If I think of myself winning the lottery, this increases my chance of winning the lottery.
19. If I think of being a millionaire, there is a better chance that I will get a million dollars
Factor 4: TAF Moral
1. Having an honourable thought is almost as good as doing an honourable deed.
2. Thinking about helping someone else is almost the same as actually helping someone.
3. When I have a kind thought about someone else, it is almost as good as paying them a
compliment.
Factor 5: TAF Ethical / Global Concern
22. If I think of myself getting away with cheating, this increases the chance that I will get away with
cheating
10. When I hear news reports of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world peace.
12. If I think about the end of global warming, it will increase the chance that global warming will
end.
24. If I think that I won’t get caught speeding, it increases the chance that I will get away with
speeding.
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